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Research

Publications

Chapters

  • Crescenzi, Mark J.C. & Bailee Donahue, 2017. ``Rediscovering Reputation Through Theory and Evidence" in Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, ed. William Thompson. New York: Oxford University Press.

Other​

  • Crescenzi, Mark J.C. & Bailee Donahue, 2017. ``Reputation in International Relations" in Oxford Bibliographies in International Relations, ed. Patrick James. New York: Oxford University Press. (Annotated Bibliography)

Dissertation

Advisors: Mark J.C. Crescenzi (Chair), Navin Bapat, Layna Mosley, Cameron Ballard-Rosa, Stephen Gent

What are the distributional consequences at the domestic level for economies that experience prolonged external economic pressure? In this dissertation, I will analyze the adaptive strategies of firms within the domestic economies targeted by multilateral security sanctions to understand the long-term economic consequences of such pressure. I pose three questions: 1) under what conditions do we observe adaptation at the sector-level as opposed to the firm-level in domestic economies; 2) how does adaptation over-time work differently at the sector-level as opposed to the firm-level; 3) what are the long-term consequences for the state's post-sanctions trade behavior. To answer these questions, I develop a dataset of trade profiles based on product-level data as well as a measure of sector-level adaptation. Further, I use several methods including machine learning and qualitative case studies to improve our understanding of how firms respond to sanctions in important and impactful ways.

Papers in Preparation

Donahue, Bailee & Mark J.C. Crescenzi, "Weathering the Storm: Discordant Learning About Reputations for Reliability"

In this paper, we investigate how reputations change, and whether states can cultivate reputational reserves that insulate them from unwanted reputation dynamics. Specifically, we examine how reputations for reliability are lost when states violate alliance terms. Can a well-established reputation insulate states from being labeled as unreliable when they violate an alliance contract? This paper develops a theory of discordant learning that predicts that a good reputation for reliability will act as a buffer that allows the violating state to weather the storm of minor crises without paying a reputational cost, whereas states with fragile reputations for reliability are more likely to be punished if they exhibit incongruent behavior. High levels of incongruence, however, such as a major alliance violation during a high-profile war, can trigger an over-correction in a state's reputation. Thus, a state with a stable and good reputation for reliability may absorb a greater reputational cost relative to a state with a fragile or moderate reputation if it exhibits highly incongruent behavior (i.e., the bigger they are the harder they fall). We employ a scenario-based survey experiment to test these expectations. Our analysis will help us understand when to expect a loss in state-reputation, and has implications for when reputation loss can influence alliance formation and conflict behavior.

Donahue, Bailee, "A Tree-Based Approach to Predicting Sanctions Success"

 

What features best predict the success of economic sanctions? Further, how do different historical periods interact with these features to increase or decrease their relative importance?  Tree-based modeling does not impose a functional form on the data generating process and accommodates complex interactions among features. I argue that this method is well-suited to investigating the periodization of sanctions success. Using the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES) data, I employ a tree-based approach to predicting sanctions success to evaluate these questions.

Donahue, Bailee, Rob Williams & Mark J.C. Crescenzi, "Unsettled Borders in a Market Context"

Border disputes between states can be very costly and disruptive, including major disruptions in trade. From an aggregate perspective, scholars traditionally expect these costs and disruptions to place pressure on states to avoid or resolve these disputes quickly. This view, however, risks oversimplification of the quality of trade and the economic actors driving that trade. We investigate the consequences of complex trade relations on border disputes. Variation in the composition of trade, whether characterized by comparative advantage trade, inter-industry trade, or intra-industry trade, generates variation in the presence and intensity of domestic pressure to avoid or resolve border disputes. We examine the effects of this variation on dispute behavior using an original dataset that combines product-level trade data (spanning from 1962-2001) with ICOW territorial claims data. The use of product-level trade data allows for the analysis of substitutability options which may reduce exit costs and make it easier to escalate border disputes. This analysis helps us better understand the choice to forego trade due to border disputes, and furthers our understanding of the economic impact of unsettled borders.